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I. INTRODUCTION 
On December 20, 2019, President Trump’s proposal to create a United 
States Space Force was signed into law.1 The Space Force will organize, train, 
and equip space forces, and provide an elevated focus on the role of space in 
military activities. As a first step, in August 2019, U.S. Space Command 
(USSPACECOM) was re-established as the eleventh unified combatant com-
mand.2 Distinct from the new service branch, USSPACECOM employs forces 
from each of the military services to achieve missions in the space domain. 
These missions include deterring aggression and conflict, defending U.S. and 
allied freedom of action, delivering space combat power for the joint forces, 
and developing space warfighters.3 
One of the key activities that USSPACECOM is taking on is Space Situa-
tional Awareness (SSA).4 Space Situational Awareness refers to the ability to 
determine where objects are in space, what they are doing, and where they 
will be in the future. The U.S. military maintains a catalogue of more than 
23,000 objects in Earth’s orbit, about 1,800 of which are active satellites.5 The 
remainder are defunct satellites, spacecraft components, discarded upper 
rocket stages, and other debris. Understanding where these objects are and 
where they are headed is necessary to ensure expensive military satellites are 
not damaged by inadvertent collisions. This capability is also necessary to de-
tect and attribute purposeful attacks on satellites. The ability to quickly and 
accurately detect and attribute any such attacks is key to deterring them. 
One of the drivers for the creation of the Space Force is the growing con-
sensus among U.S. leaders that space is a “warfighting domain.”6 Officials 
point to the kinetic anti-satellite tests carried out by China in 2007 and India 
in 2019 and the maneuvering in recent years of Russian and Chinese satellites 
that included close approaches to other satellites—in some cases, satellites 
 
 1 Fact Sheet, U.S. SPACE FORCE, https://www.spaceforce.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheet 
(last visited Jan. 17, 2020). 
 2 Aaron Mehta, Space Command to Launch Aug. 29, DEFENSENEWS (Aug. 20, 2019), 
https://www.defensenews.com/space/2019/08/20/space-command-to-launch-aug-29/. 
 3 DEP’T. OF DEF., UNITED STATES SPACE COMMAND FACT SHEET (2019), https://media.d 
efense.gov/2019/Aug/29/2002177208/-1/1/1/USSPACECOM%20FACT%20SHEET.pdf. 
 4 Sandra Erwin, U.S. Space Command’s Major Components Will Be Based in Califor-
nia and Colorado, SPACE NEWS (June 30, 2019), https://spacenews.com/u-s-space-comma 
nds-major-components-will-be-based-in-california-and-colorado. 
 5 Steve Brady, 18th SPCS Stands Guard over Space, AIR FORCE SPACE COMMAND 
(Mar. 6, 2018), https://www.afspc.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/1459151/18th-spc 
s-stands-guard-over-space. 
 6 Attacking Satellites is Increasingly Attractive—and Dangerous, ECONOMIST (July 18, 
2019), https://www.economist.com/briefing/2019/07/18/attacking-satellites-is-increasingl 
y-attractive-and-dangerous. 
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owned by the United States.7 In 2018, the Commander of the Air Force’s 20th 
Space Control Squadron made the argument that SSA should be thought of as 
Space Battle Management—“continuous preparation of the battlespace in or-
der to fight and win a war in space”—and emphasized the need for “effective 
weaponeering of SSA sensors.”8 
However, the U.S. military is not the only entity in need of high-quality 
SSA data. In fact, all satellite operators require this information in order to 
avoid accidental collisions that could damage or destroy their spacecraft. As 
the number of civil and commercial space actors has increased, the risk of 
collision—and need for data—has been growing. Emerging plans for “mega 
constellations” of hundreds or thousands of small satellites is adding to the 
urgency in this area.9 Both military and civil satellite operators are aware that 
collisions in space have impacts reaching far beyond the satellites immedi-
ately involved, as these events generate debris that increases the risk of colli-
sion for other satellites, with potentially cascading effects.10 
In this rapidly changing environment, there is a recognition that the status 
quo is not sufficient for U.S. military objectives nor civil and commercial sat-
ellite operator needs. In response, multiple steps are being taken. Outside of 
the United States, many nations are actively developing or improving their 
SSA capabilities.11 Commercial entities have emerged that are collecting, an-
alyzing, and selling their own SSA data and services. The U.S. military is 
investing in technical improvements and engaging in cooperative agreements 
with commercial and foreign entities to improve its SSA capabilities. The U.S. 
Department of Commerce is preparing to take on a new role in sharing SSA 
data with commercial and foreign entities.12 Given the many concurrent and 
often interrelated developments in this sector, there are many possibilities for 
future international SSA interactions. 
This Article examines the legal issues related to SSA. What is the interna-
tional and national legal regime that governs current SSA activities, and how 
might this regime evolve in the future to address challenges in the rapidly 
evolving space sector? 
 
 7 TODD HARRISON, KAITLYN JOHNSON & THOMAS G. ROBERTS, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC 
AND INT’L STUDIES AEROSPACE SEC. PROJECT, SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2019 (2019). 
 8 Erin Salinas, Space Situational Awareness Is Space Battlefield Management, AIR 
FORCE SPACE COMMAND (May 16, 2018), https://www.afspc.af.mil/News/Article-Display/ 
Article/1523196/space-situational-awareness-is-space-battle-management/. 
 9 See generally Satellite Safety: Ensuring the Safety of the International Earth Observ-
ing Constellation Satellites, NAT’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN., https://satellitesafety.g 
sfc.nasa.gov/ (last visited Mar. 17, 2020). 
 10 See Salinas, supra note 8. 
 11 Id. 
 12 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Remarks by Commerce Secretary Wilbur L. 
Ross at the Space Startup Summit (Oct. 21, 2019) (on file with U.S. Dep’t of Commerce 
Office of Pub. Affairs). 
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II. SPACE SITUATIONAL AWARENESS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
SSA is not explicitly mentioned in any of the outer space treaties, nor in 
any other legally binding international agreement.13 However, there are mul-
tiple clauses within these treaties that may bear on SSA activities and respon-
sibilities.14 
The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Explo-
ration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bod-
ies, commonly known as the Outer Space Treaty (OST), provides the broad 
legal framework for activities in outer space.15 Gerie Palanca argues that Ar-
ticle I, which states that “exploration and use of outer space . . . shall be car-
ried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries,”16 presents an over-
all culture of space activity that should aim to mitigate collisions and the 
creation of space debris.17 Similarly, he notes, Article IX states that “States 
Parties to the Treaty shall be guided by the principle of cooperation and mu-
tual assistance.”18 Joanne Wheeler, LLM, calls attention to the portions of Ar-
ticle IX that call on states to conduct activities with “due regard to the corre-
sponding interests of all other States Parties to the Treaty,” and call on states 
to “avoid harmful contamination.”19 Based on these clauses, one could argue 
that in the spirit of the Outer Space Treaty, States operating in space should 
collect, use, and share SSA information in order to avoid debris creation and 
ensure that space remains usable for all countries now and in the future. 
More commonly, however, experts have called attention to Article VI, 
which notes that States Parties to the Treaty bear international responsibility 
for national activities in outer space, even if those activities are carried out by 
non-governmental entities. States Parties are required to provide “authoriza-
tion and continuing supervision of these activities.”20 Taken together with the 
 
 13 Stefan A. Kaiser, Legal and Policy Aspects of Space Situational Awareness, 31 SPACE 
POL’Y 5 (2015). 
 14 PATRICK M. SCHWOMEYER, THE U.S. OUTER SPACE SITUATIONAL AWARENESS 
SHARING LAW: SHARING INFORMATION ABOUT SSA AND THE NEED FOR GLOBAL 
COOPERATION (2013) (Can.); see generally Kaiser, supra note 13; Gerie W. Palanca, Space 
Traffic Management at the National and International Levels, 16 ASTROPOLITICS 141 
(2018); BHAVYA LAL, ASHA BALAKRISHNAN, BECAJA M. CALDWELL, REINA S. 
BUENCONSEJO & SARA A. CARIOSCIA, GLOBAL TRENDS IN SPACE SITUATIONAL AWARENESS 
(SSA) AND SPACE TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT (STM) 61–74 (2018); Phillip A. Slann, Space 
Debris and the Need for Space Traffic Control, 30 SPACE POL’Y 40 (2014). 
 15 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of 
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Dec. 5, 1979, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 
610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty]. 
 16 Id. at art. I. 
 17 Palanca, supra note 14. 
 18 Id. (quoting Outer Space Treaty, supra note 15, at art. IX). 
 19 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 15, at art. IX. 
 20 Id. 
2020] SPACE SITUATIONAL AWARENESS 699 
responsibility to avoid harmful contamination, this could be interpreted to 
mean that states are required to ensure that satellite operators in their state, 
both governmental and commercial, use SSA data to avoid collisions that 
would damage other spacecraft and generate debris that contaminate the space 
environment. 
In addition to the OST, scholars have also noted that the 1972 Convention 
on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (the Liability 
Convention) and the 1976 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched 
into Outer Space (the Registration Convention) are relevant to this issue.21 
Article III of the Liability Convention makes clear that States are internation-
ally liable if a space object for which their state is responsible damages the 
space object of another state.22 This strengthens the incentives that States have 
to ensure that satellite operators for which they are responsible use SSA data 
to avoid any potential collisions. If a collision does occur that damages an-
other satellite, the state may be liable for that damage.23 
Further, Article I defines the term “space object” “to include component 
parts of a space object, as well as its launch vehicle and parts thereof.”24 This 
suggests that states are liable not only for the damage done during the initial 
collision, but also for any subsequent damage that occurs due to the debris 
created from the collision. This provides further incentive for the collection 
and use of SSA data to avoid collisions, as the total amount of damage caused 
over time could be significant. It also creates an incentive to have access to 
SSA data of adequate quality to identify the country at fault if a nation’s own 
satellites are damaged by an in-space collision. 
Article VI of the Liability Convention adds additional complexity, noting 
that liability would not hold in cases where “the damage has resulted either 
wholly or partially from gross negligence . . . on the part of a claimant 
State.”25 So, one might argue that, if a state failed to obtain and act on high-
quality SSA data, that state would be ineligible to seek compensation for dam-
age caused by the collision.26 This argument would be stronger if low-cost or 
 
 21 See, e.g., PATRICK SCHWOMEYER, THE U.S. OUTER SPACE SITUATION AWARENESS 
SHARING LAW: SHARING INFORMATION ABOUT SSA AND THE NEED FOR GLOBAL 
COOPERATION (2013); Slann, supra note 14, at 40–42. 
 22 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, Mar. 29, 
1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter Liability Convention]. 
 23 It is important to note that these incentives are complicated by the fact that there is no 
clear guidance in determining fault in a collision between two spacecraft. In the case that 
an accidental collision occurs, it is not clear which of the two states involved would be 
found to be at fault, and perhaps neither would be held responsible. This may be part of the 
reason that no claims related to in-space collisions have ever been submitted under the 
Liability Convention. 
 24 Liability Convention, supra note 22, at 2392. 
 25 Id. 
 26 One could also argue that nations without access to SSA data might be better able to 
seek compensation than those with high-quality SSA systems. States without good data 
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free SSA data were widely available, creating an incentive for nations to share 
their SSA data. Yu Takeuchi notes that the criteria for fault liability can grad-
ually change based on advancements in technology and changes in standard 
operating procedures.27 For example, if freely available SSA data was used by 
most satellite operators, a satellite operator that chose not to use the data may 
not be eligible to seek damages in the event of a collision. 
Typically, the desire to not lose one’s own satellite will be sufficient in-
centive for any spacecraft operator to do their best to avoid collisions. As the 
number of relatively small, inexpensive satellites increases, however, the lia-
bility-related incentives may become increasingly important. Some spacecraft 
operators have begun designing constellations with a “Silicon Valley” mind-
set that allows for failure and rapid replacement of small, relatively inexpen-
sive satellites. For these operators, the loss of one or more of their own satel-
lites may be a minor issue,28 but liability for damage to a multi-million-dollar 
satellite could be sufficient to bankrupt their business. While an interesting 
approach from a business perspective, from a space debris perspective, this 
new model is a problem. 
The 1976 Registration Convention sets up a mandatory system for regis-
tering objects launched into space.29 Objects are registered with the United 
Nations Secretary General with basic information regarding the object’s orbit 
and general function. The registry includes the date and location of launch, 
and States are required to notify the Secretary General when the object is no 
longer in earth orbit.30 
Part of the goal of the registry is to assist in the identification of these 
objects and “contribute to the application . . . of international law governing 
the exploration and use of outer space.”31 Most relevant to the issue of SSA, 
Article VI of the Registration Convention states that in cases in which the 
registry is inadequate for identifying a space object that has caused damage, 
“other States Parties, including in particular States possessing monitoring and 
tracking facilities, shall respond to the greatest extent feasible to a request by 
 
could argue that they were unable to detect or maneuver, and thus were not negligent. Na-
tions that had access to adequate SSA data but failed to act on it would be more likely to 
be considered negligent. However, to the extent that commercial SSA data is available, or 
in cases where nations with high-quality SSA data make that data, or the resulting conjunc-
tion assessments, freely available, they can help to negate such an argument. Thus, in a 
roundabout way, this creates an incentive for SSA data sharing. 
 27 Yu Takeuchi, Law and Policy for Space Situational Awareness Towards Space Traffic 
Management—A Japanese Perspective, 6 J. SPACE SAFETY ENGINEERING 130, 135 (2019). 
 28 To the extent that collisions may create debris that significantly increase collision 
risks in the orbit in which their constellation operates, these operators are also naturally 
incentivized to avoid collisions. 
 29 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Jan. 14, 1975, 28 
U.S.T. 695, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15 [hereinafter Registration Convention]. 
 30 Id. at 17. 
 31 Id. at 16. 
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that State Party . . . for assistance under equitable and reasonable conditions 
in the identification of the object.”32 The Registration Convention does not 
require that nations share SSA data, but it does strongly encourage it, at least 
in instances where damage has occurred.33 
However, Kaiser notes that although the drafters of the Registration Con-
vention intended it to be useful in the identification of space objects in issues 
of responsibility and liability, the information required is not sufficient to do 
so in today’s space environment. Furthermore, by identifying the exact infor-
mation a state is required to disclose, the Registration Convention implies that 
further information is not legally required. This provides a legal basis to argue 
that under current international law, SSA data exchanges are purely voluntary, 
not a legal obligation.34 
As demonstrated above, collecting, using, and sharing space situational 
data seems well within the spirit of the Outer Space Treaty. The treaties also 
create multiple incentives for nations to collect and use data, with respect to 
their own space activities as well as those of entities for which they are re-
sponsible. Because nations are liable for damage caused by their spacecraft, 
they have an incentive to use SSA data to predict and avoid collisions that 
may cause such damage—through the initial collisions as well as subsequent 
collisions caused by the resulting debris. In addition, nations have an incentive 
to maintain good SSA to identify the responsible nation in the case that their 
own spacecraft is damaged by an in-space collision. Sharing SSA data can 
help to increase the likelihood that other nations act responsibly in space and 
are liable for any damage caused if they do not. However, despite the encour-
agements and incentives created by the treaties, none establish a legal require-
ment for collecting, using, or sharing SSA data. 
III. SPACE SITUATIONAL AWARENESS AND U.S. LAW 
Given the lack of international requirements, and because of the im-
portance of SSA data for military activities, SSA developments—both legal 
and technical—have traditionally occurred on the national level. The United 
States maintains the most advanced SSA capability in the world. The military 
operates the vast Space Surveillance Network, made up of ground- and space-
based telescopes as well as radars.35 The 18th Space Control Squadron (18 
SPCS) processes this data along with other information about the identity of 
spacecraft in orbit and generates a catalogue of space objects.36 Based on this 
 
 32 Id. at 18. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Stefan A. Kaiser, Legal and Policy Aspects of Space Situational Awareness, 31 SPACE 
POL’Y 5, 5–12 (2015). 
 35 LAL ET AL., supra note 14, at app. A. 
 36 Id. 
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catalogue, they are able to conduct conjunction analyses to determine if two 
objects are likely to be in close proximity in the near future, potentially war-
ranting a maneuver to decrease the risk of a collision.37 For many years, a 
subset of the catalogue was made available to NASA, which then made the 
data available to other space operators.38 
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 established 
a pilot program within the Department of Defense for provision of satellite 
tracking support to entities outside United States Government, including for-
eign and commercial entities. Data was only to be provided when it was de-
termined to be in the national security interests of the United States, and enti-
ties wishing to receive data were required to sign an agreement not to transfer 
any data or technical information to other entities.39 As a result, the U.S. Air 
Force set up the space-track website, through which a portion of the data in 
the space catalogue was made available to registered users. The quality of data 
available through the website was lower than that in the internal 18 SPCS 
system and was generally considered insufficient for conducting independent 
conjunction analyses. 
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 established 
the SSA Data Sharing Program. The act authorized the Secretary of Defense 
to both provide SSA information, as well as obtain such information, from 
non-U.S. government entities. The act also stated that the United States is im-
mune from any suit in any court related to the provision of SSA data.40 This 
stipulation is reflected in the space-track website user agreement. The user 
agreement also notes that data in the public catalogue should not be used for 
conjunction assessment.41 
While users are not able to conduct independent analyses, the 18 SPCS 
screens all active satellites against the satellite catalog multiple times a day, 
and if a close approach is detected and meets certain emergency criteria, 18 
SPCS will attempt to notify the satellite owner or operator. To receive more 
complete information, as well as other advanced services, entities must sign 
an SSA Sharing Agreement with USSPACECOM.42 In April 2019, the United 
States signed its 100th Space Situational Awareness Agreement. Agreements 
 
 37 Id. 
 38 Rick W. Sturdevant, From Satellite Tracking to Space Situational Awareness: The 
USAF and Space Surveillance, 55 AIR POWER HIST. 4, 19 (2008). 
 39 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-
136, § 913, 117 Stat. 1392. 
 40 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-
84, § 912, 125 Stat. 2190. 
 41 User Agreement, SPACE-TRACK.ORG, https://www.space-track.org/documentation#/u 
ser_agree (last updated Aug. 1, 2019). 
 42 SSA Sharing & Orbital Data Requests (ODR), SPACE-TRACK.ORG, http://www.space- 
track.org/documentation#odr (last visited Oct. 13, 2019). 
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have been signed with twenty nations, two regional organizations, and sev-
enty-eight commercial satellite owner-operator-launchers.43 
In 2015, Congress passed the U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competi-
tiveness Act. The act directed the Secretary of Transportation to examine the 
feasibility of taking on the task of processing and releasing safety related SSA 
data and information.44 The resulting report confirmed that it would be feasi-
ble for a civil agency, specifically the Department of Transportation, to take 
on this role.45 
In June 2018, the Trump Administration released Space Policy Directive 
3 (SPD-3), which deals with SSA and Space Traffic Management. SPD-3 calls 
for advancements in SSA science and technology, facilitation of U.S. com-
mercial leadership in SSA, and provision of U.S. Government-supported basic 
SSA data free from direct user fees.46 The directive stated that the Department 
of Commerce should take on the role of distributing SSA data and infor-
mation.47 Congress then wrote this planned transition into law, although it did 
not specify which civil agency would take the lead. The John McCain Na-
tional Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 required the President 
to provide a plan for a department or agency, other than the Department of 
Defense (DoD), to provide SSA services and information to non-U.S. Gov-
ernment entities.48 It required that beginning in 2024, the DoD only share in-
formation when necessary to meet national security interests.49 
At the same time the U.S. government was beginning to improve its data 
sharing capabilities, commercial entities also emerged to address the demand 
for better SSA data. These companies focus on data collection, catalog devel-
opment and conjunction analyses, and other special services.50 Companies 
collecting information on space assets using ground-based systems are not 
subject to regulation. 
Those planning space-based SSA systems must seek a license from the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) to conduct “non-
Earth imaging.” These regulations include a number of restrictions on data 
 
 43 Karen Singer, 100th Space Sharing Agreement Signed, Romania Space Agency Joins, 
U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND (Apr. 26, 2019), https://www.stratcom.mil/Media/News/News 
ArticleView/Article/1825882/100th-space-sharing-agreement-signed-romania-spaceagen 
cy-joins/. 
 44 U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, Pub. L. No. 114-90, 129 Stat. 
704 (codified as amended at 51 U.S.C. § 10101 (2015)). 
 45 DANIEL MORGAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45416, COMMERCIAL SPACE: FEDERAL 
REGULATION, OVERSIGHT, AND UTILIZATION 16 (2018). 
 46 Space Policy Directive-3, 83 Fed. Reg. 28,969 (June 18, 2018). 
 47 Id. 
 48 John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L. 
No. 115-232, 132 Stat. 1636 (2018). 
 49 Id. at 2106. 
 50 LAL ET AL., supra note 14, at 53. 
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quality and data sharing. Imagery resolution is limited to 0.5 meters or coarser, 
and the imagery may only be disseminated if metadata such as time, position, 
and attitude of the sensor is removed.51 Tracking data must be correlated with 
the U.S. Government-approved space track catalog found at space-track.org, 
and all uncorrelated observations must be submitted to NOAA for correlation 
and determination of release-ability. Observations determined to be non-re-
leasable must be purged from servers and storage devices.52 Some industry 
groups have complained that these regulations are overly restrictive and will 
limit U.S. commercial developments, while having no impact on the actions 
of potential adversaries.53 
In April 2019, the Department of Commerce released a request for infor-
mation on commercial capabilities in SSA data, suggesting they are open to 
coordinating with commercial entities in the creation of a civil government 
SSA capability.54 However, Congress has not yet fully supported the admin-
istration’s plans. In the Fiscal Year 2020 spending bill, the House Appropria-
tions Committee rejected the proposal to elevate the Office of Space Com-
merce within the Department of Commerce and did not provide funding to 
enable other plans laid out in SPD-3.55 
Over the past fifteen years, U.S. law and policy has been promoting in-
creased SSA data sharing with non-U.S. government entities, moving from a 
DoD-run pilot program to an operational program with 100 partners and now 
potentially transitioning to a civil agency-run data sharing program. The 
United States has been supportive of commercial SSA developments in the 
United States, actively working with both commercial and foreign entities. 
Still, the future of SSA systems globally is uncertain. The next section looks 
at three potential future arrangements for global provision of SSA infor-
mation. 
IV. THE FUTURE OF SPACE SITUATIONAL AWARENESS 
SSA information is critical to defense organizations that require such in-
formation to monitor and protect military space assets, as well as to detect and 
 
 51 JOSEF KOLLER, DEP’T OF DEF., UPDATES TO NATIONAL SECURITY RELATED LICENSE 
CONDITIONS 5 (2017). 
 52 Id.; Licensing of Private Remote Sensing Space Systems, 84 Fed. Reg. 93 (proposed 
May 14, 2019). 
 53 BRIAN WEEDEN, NAT’L OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., RIN 0648-BA15, 
COMMENTS OF THE CONSORTIUM FOR THE EXECUTION OF RENDEZVOUS AND SERVICING 
OPERATIONS IN THE MATTER OF LICENSING OF PRIVATE REMOTE SENSING SPACE SYSTEMS- 
ADVANCE NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING (2019). 
 54 Request for Information on Commercial Capabilities in Space Situational Awareness 
Data and Space Traffic Management Services, 84 Fed. Reg. 14645, 14645 (Apr. 11, 2019). 
 55 Theresa Hitchens, HAC Stiffs New Commerce Bureau for Satellite Regulation, 
BREAKING DEF. (May 21, 2019), https://breakingdefense.com/2019/05/hac-stiffs-new-com 
merce-bureau-for-satellite-regulation/. 
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attribute any attacks on space assets. Non-military satellite operators also need 
the information to avoid unintentional collisions that could damage or destroy 
their spacecraft. It could also potentially be used to help determine liability in 
case of such damage. If SSA information is broadly available and use of this 
information becomes standard operating procedure, failure to use it could po-
tentially be considered gross negligence and could negate the ability to seek 
damages in case of a collision. Each of these applications requires timely, ac-
curate, and trusted SSA information. This section examines three potential 
regimes under which such information may be provided in the future, includ-
ing: (1) a U.S.-centric system, (2) a cooperative international system, and (3) 
a multipolar system. 
 
A. U.S.-Centric Space Situational Awareness System 
 
The first scenario is an extension of the current status quo. The U.S. mili-
tary collects SSA data, conducts conjunction analyses for all active space ob-
jects, and provides conjunction warnings to all satellite operators, as well as 
open access to basic catalog information, all free of charge.56 While some 
other entities operate SSA systems, none do so on the scale of the United 
States, and none provide free access to data for all users.57 
The United States has demonstrated a commitment to continue providing 
this service through both executive directives and policy as well as law. SSA 
programs are complex and expensive, and under this regime, satellite opera-
tors around the world, including foreign governments and private entities, 
could avoid significant costs by relying on the highly capable U.S. system. 
However, a number of operators have already expressed discomfort about 
relying solely on the U.S. military for SSA information, particularly given the 
opacity of the information.58 The United States does not share its sensor data 
or its high-fidelity catalog, nor does it provide any insight into its algorithms 
and methods of analysis.59 The United States is increasing the amount of in-
formation it makes available and intends to continue to improve the quality its 
SSA information overall, but given the military sensitivities, access to infor-
mation will likely always be limited to a significant extent.60 
As more space objects are launched, potential conjunctions and the need 
for maneuvers will become more common. As this occurs, it will be more 
important for operators to be able to conduct independent analysis to 
 
 56 LAL ET AL., supra note 14. 
 57 Id. at F-2, iii. 
 58 Id. at V. 
 59 Id. at 38. 
 60 Theresa Hitchens, Intel Community’s Secrecy Culture Frustrates DoD Sat Safety Ef-
fort, BREAKING DEF. (Aug. 26, 2019), https://breakingdefense.com/2019/08/intel-communi 
tys-secrecy-culture-frustrates-dod-sat-safety-effort/. 
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determine whether they will conduct a maneuver—something that is not pos-
sible when underlying sensor data is not shared. If a global space traffic man-
agement regime is developed that requires operators to conduct maneuvers 
under certain circumstances, it will likely be problematic that operators 
around the world will need to trust the United States to determine when such 
circumstances occur. Similarly, space actors may not be comfortable trusting 
the United States for information regarding attribution and liability. These 
seemingly intractable challenges suggest that there will be a demand for alter-
native sources of information. 
 
B. International Space Situational Awareness Program 
 
Another option proposed numerous times is an international SSA program. 
David Koplow argued that spacefaring nations should create a new interna-
tional organization for SSA as a step towards avoiding conflict in outer 
space.61 As part of this effort, nations would “unite to pool their resources in 
monitoring outer space and sharing information about the location, trajectory, 
and attributes of space objects.”62 He states that such a system, made up of 
resources from many states, would be more capable than any one country 
could achieve on its own.63 Koplow argues that although this system could be 
created based on non-legally-binding activities, it would be more firmly 
grounded in a new treaty.64 He notes that there is president for cooperative 
verification regimes in other treaties, and that cooperative ventures in space 
activities have been “spectacularly successful” in the past.65 
Focusing on non-military uses, P.J. Blount argues that an international 
SSA system, built on open data sharing, is necessary to enable space traffic 
management activities.66 If satellite operators are expected to move their space 
assets to avoid collisions, they must trust the data underlying such a require-
ment.67 Blount argues that “the ability to verify data is implicit to trust in that 
system,” and thus the data must be made openly available to facilitate such 
verification.68 Blount acknowledges that implementation of this system may 
be a challenge, given the national security aspects of SSA systems, as well as 
the fact that three of the most advanced SSA systems are operated by 
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nations—the United States, Russia, and China—with adversarial relationships 
with each other.69 
This is the primary flaw with an international system. Although it could 
effectively address the issue of trust, significant political will is required to 
create such a system, and there is no indication that the United States or any 
other nation active in this area is interested in pursuing this option. In a 2018 
review of global Space Situational Awareness activities, the Institute for De-
fense Analysis concluded that “most governments see SSA first and foremost 
as a critical national security function, and military organization interests are 
likely to remain dominant in this area.”70 Given this focus, the creation of an 
international cooperative regime will be a significant challenge. 
 
C. Multi-Polar Space Situational Awareness System 
 
A third possibility is a multi-polar SSA system in which nations, regions, 
or commercial entities develop and maintain an independent SSA capability, 
providing satellite operators with multiple sources of SSA information. Such 
a system might incorporate some level of international cooperation, such as 
data standardization and interoperability, to improve SSA more generally. 
Such a system may look similar to the Global Navigation Satellite System 
(GNSS) sector. The United States was the leader in GNSS capabilities and 
made the signal from its military-owned Global Positioning System (GPS) 
constellation freely available.71 Eventually, a handful of other nations devel-
oped independent GNSS systems: Russia’s GLONASS, China’s Beidou, and 
Europe’s Galileo.72 There are also regional augmentation systems as well as a 
vast array of commercial value-added services built on the data provided by 
these systems.73 The International GNSS Service (IGS), a voluntary federa-
tion of entities across 100 countries, operates a global network of GNSS 
ground stations, data centers, and data analysis centers to provide access to 
data and data products based on all major global and regional satellite naviga-
tion systems.74 
While the United States currently operates the most advanced SSA system, 
other nations are developing or improving their own SSA capabilities. The 
 
 69 Id. 
 70 LAL ET AL., supra note 14, at 79. 
 71 Thuy Mai, Global Positioning System History, NASA (Aug. 7, 2017), https://www.na 
sa.gov/directorates/heo/scan/communications/policy/GPS_History.html. 
 72 LAL ET AL., supra note 14, at 57. 
 73 International Committee on GNSS, Providers’ Forum, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR 
OUTER SPACE AFFAIRS, https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/icg/providers-forum/pri 
nciples.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2020). 
 74 GARY JOHNSTON ET AL., The International GNSS Service, in SPRINGER HANDBOOK OF 
GLOBAL NAVIGATION SATELLITE SYSTEMS 967–82 (2017). 
708 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L [Vol. 48:695 
Russian Academy of Sciences operates the International Scientific Optical 
Network, and the Russian military also operates a space surveillance system.75 
China maintains an SSA system and has explored expanding its efforts in co-
operation with other nations.76 Europe has also announced plans to develop a 
space surveillance and tracking system.77 In addition to national activities, a 
number of companies have begun to collect independent SSA observations.78 
ExoAnalytics, for example, operates more than 200 ground-based telescopes 
around the world.79 If these entities continue to improve their SSA capabilities 
and increase their information-sharing efforts, they could rival the United 
States as a source of global SSA data. 
Access to multiple independent sources of SSA data would help to allevi-
ate issues of trust. If the multiple data providers agreed on the likelihood of a 
collision, a satellite operator could be confident in the need for a maneuver. 
Of course, if the various providers produced conflicting information, this 
would pose a challenge for the operator. It would also pose significant issues 
in determining liability in the event that a collision does occur. However, if a 
non-governmental or intergovernmental body were able to combine data 
sources and investigate the differences, it may be possible to improve the sit-
uation. Awareness of differences may also encourage standardization and im-
provements across data providers. 
A multi-polar Space Situational Awareness system does not fully address 
the need for trusted data to avoid collisions and determine liability, at least in 
the near-term. However, such a system seems achievable given current global 
trends, and would allow for the possibility of greater interoperability and 
standardization in the future. As such, it offers a practical middle-ground com-
pared to a U.S.-centric or international SSA system. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Space situational awareness is critical for enabling safe and sustainable 
activities in space. It is needed for protecting and deterring attacks on military 
assets and for avoiding unintentional collisions that can destroy spacecraft and 
create debris that endangers others long into the future. Despite the importance 
of SSA, it is not directly addressed in the Outer Space Treaty, nor in any other 
legally binding international agreement. However, the use and sharing of SSA 
data is well-aligned with the spirit of the treaty and is incentivized by interna-
tional agreements regarding liability for damage to space assets. 
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The United States military currently operates the most advanced SSA sys-
tem in the world, and national law and policy have repeatedly encouraged and 
increased SSA data sharing requirements. As of 2019, the United States had 
committed to maintain an openly available public catalog of space objects and 
conduct conjunction analysis for all operational space assets. In addition, it 
had signed 100 agreements to facilitate enhanced data sharing with a variety 
of entities. 
Moving forward, new actors and new technologies are likely to lead to 
large increases in the number of space objects in orbit. At the same time, in-
creasing reliance on space assets, particularly by the military, makes these 
objects potential targets in the event of a conflict. All of these trends increase 
the importance of timely, accurate SSA information. This Article examined 
three possible regimes for future SSA data provision: a U.S.-centric SSA sys-
tem, an international SSA system, and a multi-polar SSA system. Each of 
these systems presents strengths and weaknesses, reflecting the difficult bal-
ance among national security concerns, trust and transparency, economic re-
sources, and political will. 
Ultimately, a multi-polar system seems most likely to emerge, given cur-
rent trends. Conflicting information may pose challenges to international co-
ordination and the conduct of international law in the near term. However, 
international efforts to address these differences and facilitate interoperability 
could ultimately lead to improved SSA information for all. 
 
